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1 On the 30th of November 2006, the Congress led UPA government released a 400-page
document called the “Sachar Commission Report.”1 More than a year earlier in March
2005, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had commissioned a retired Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court to conduct an inquiry into the social, economic and educational status
of  Indian  Muslims.  The  report’s  findings  highlighted  the  “relative  deprivation”  of
Muslims compared to other communities and made suggestions aimed at alleviating
their  condition across  the  country.  Over  the  next  decade,  the  report  attained near
totemic power amongst Muslims as empirical proof of their “backwardness” and an
official acknowledgment of their marginalization. 
2 The Sachar Report was widely covered by the media and much discussed by academics,
intellectuals and politicians. It also became a reference point within the community to
the  key  changes  that  were  needed:  an  equal  opportunity  commission,  nomination
procedure to increase participation in the various civil, police and military services,
delimitation  in  constituencies  that  were  reserved  for  SC  candidates  despite  a  high
minority  population,  increased  educational  opportunities  and  the  linking  and
acceptance of madrassa degrees in institutes of higher learning and in the public and
private job sectors. In a sense, the Sachar Committee Report became synonymous with
the demands of Muslims for equal treatment and for their rights. I can recall a number
of community meetings in which the Sachar Committee would be waved in the air as if
to say, “look even the government recognizes our backwardness.” 
3 Ten years later in 2016 Muslims continued to lag behind on most indicators and a large
number  of  the  recommendations  of  the  Sachar  Report  remained  unimplemented
(Shaikh 2016). Towards the end of the NDA’s first term (2018) the report was targeted
by BJP national spokesperson on Economic Affairs, Gopal Krishan Agarwal, who wrote,
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The UPA during 2004 to 2014 tried to create divisions in the Indian society to
reap electoral gains. It made attempts to pass “Communal Violence Bill” that
was against the Hindus, the Right to Education (RTE) Act exempted only the
minority educational institutions from its ambit, creating an incentive for
various  sub-sects  to  dissociate  from Hinduism.  The UPA government  had
constituted Sachar Committee for Muslims and was trying to make changes,
which were extra-unconstitutional.  A fabricated narrative in the name of
“Saffron Terror” was developed by Congress government in order to
consolidate Muslim votes (Agarwal 2018).
Agarwal’s statement clearly dismisses the Sachar Committee Report as nothing more
than a Congress sop. In other words, Agarwal deems the act of even acknowledging
Muslim backwardness as a form of appeasement. This is of course in continuance with
the BJP’s  policy of  characterizing the time between 1947 and 2014 as one in which
Hindus were discriminated against  and Muslims were unfairly the recipients of  the
state’s largess. 
4 By  December  2019,  in  Lucknow,  a  group  of  citizens  from  various  professions,
backgrounds  and  affiliations  had  gathered  to  discuss  how  to  articulate  and  plan
protests  against  the  controversial  Citizenship  Amendment  Act  (CAA).2 One  of  the
speakers stood up and began with the customary nod to the Sachar Committee Report
but before he could finish, another participant interrupted and said “Arre Sahib, Sachar
bhuliye ab Samvidhān ki bāt kijiye” or “but Sir, forget about the Sachar Report and talk
about the Constitution.” This seemingly offhand and almost obvious comment contains
within it the key to understanding the manner in which Muslims have experienced a
shift from marginalization to exclusion. The Sachar Committee Report had underscored
various kinds of marginalization, but the threat posed by the CAA was fundamentally
linked to  exclusion from that  most  basic  recognition and right  granted by  a  state:
citizenship. 
5 At various protests  against  the CAA all  over  India,  pride of  place was given to  the
“father” of the constitution, B. R. Ambedkar, whose pictures outnumbered those of M.
K.  Gandhi.  Protestors  organized  mass  readings  of  the  preamble,  and  placards  and
memes derived from articles of the constitution were raised in public and on social
media  posts.  Most  importantly  the  anti-CAA  movement  was  styled  as  a  protest  to
protect the constitution. “Samvidhān Bachāo” or “Save the Constitution” was perhaps
the slogan that I heard most often, whether in Delhi, Aligarh, Lucknow or elsewhere.
While talking to a number of protestors at various protest sites about why they were
opposing  a  bill  that  was  aimed  at  granting  citizenship  to  “persecuted  religious
minorities and ‘only’ excluded Muslims from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh,” a
recurrent answer was about how they saw this as the short end of the wedge. “Hamari
bāri  āye gi” or “Our turn will  come,” “yeh to bas shuru’āt  hai” or “this is merely the
beginning,” “ab vujūd ki ladā’i hai” or “now it’s a fight for survival” were just some of
the phrases that came up again and again. The fear that the CAA was the beginning of
the  eventual  disenfranchisement  of  the  Muslims  was  compounded  by  deliberate
obfuscation on the part of the BJP as to whether they would begin a nationwide register
of citizens (NRC). An India wide NRC was a part of the BJP’s election manifesto in the
2019 national elections. The CAA protests then, marked a moment of resistance against
what may very well prove to be India’s Nuremberg moment.3 
6 The shift from marginalization towards exclusion was not just political but indeed was
accompanied by similar shifts in the economic, social, cultural and indeed legal and
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institutional status of Muslims. However, before illustrating the manner in which these
shifts took place it is important to briefly highlight how the BJP’s politics have not only
gone  through a  transformation  but  also  how this  has  impacted  the  wider  political
landscape. 
 
Muslims and the BJP
7 Faisal Devji argued that the Muslim had entered Indian history in 1947 as the “symbol
of national frustration and insecurity” and thus in effect represented “the anxiety of
nationalism”  (Devji 1992).  It  is  precisely  these  emotions  that  can  be  located  in  the
writings of the ideological progenitors of Hindutva. They portray Muslims and Islam as
a  threat  to  Indian  civilization  which  is  understood  as  fundamentally  Hindu
(Sarkar 2019). V. D. Savarkar, whose portrait now graces the walls of India’s parliament,
wrote of the humiliations foisted upon Hindus by treacherous foreigners,  especially
Muslims (Savarkar 2009).  M.  S.  Golwalkar,  the second sarsanghchalak or  head of  the
Rāshtriya Swāyamsēvak Sangh (RSS), an organization that provides ideological direction
to the Bhārtiya Jantā Party, wrote about Indian Christians and Muslims that “they are
born in this land, no doubt. But are they true to its salt? ...No.” He goes on to say:
They have also developed a feeling of identification with the enemies of this
land.  They  look  to  some  foreign  lands  as  their  holy  places.  They  call
themselves  Sheikhs  or  Syeds…They  still  think  they  have  come  here  to
conquer and establish their kingdoms. So we can see that it is not merely a
case of change of faith, but a change even in national identity. What else is it
if  not treason, to join the camp of the enemy leaving behind the mother
nation in the lurch? (Golwalkar 1993)
8 It is not surprising therefore that the trope of Muslim as “foreigner” and in particular
as “a traitor” who threatens the very existence of India is still part of BJP’s politics
today.  Indeed  one  of  the  slogans  propagated  by  BJP  members  of  parliament,4
politicians5 as well as other functionaries and supporters6 during the anti-CAA protests
was “desh ke ghaddāron ko,  goli  māro sālon ko” or “Traitors to the country, shoot the
bastards.” The Organiser, a mouthpiece for the RSS, sought to argue that the anti-CAA
protests were part of a “Jihadi-Communist alliance” and were unusual in that they took
place in areas with a large Muslim population, which are simultaneously “believed to
be centers of Bangladeshi migrants” (Ketkar 2019).
9 Whereas the RSS was explicit in declaring that Muslims were part of a conspiracy to
destabilize India, members of the BJP were less direct, but by no means less ambiguous,
in drawing equivalence between anti-CAA protestors and Muslims. During an election
rally in Dumka (Jharkhand) Prime Minster Modi went so far as to declare that those
who spread violence were “recognisable through their clothes” (Kumar 2019). This was
a reference to the niqābs and hijābs worn by the Muslim women who had taken a lead in
organizing anti-CAA protests across the country but perhaps most famously in Shaheen
Bagh, a primarily Muslim neighborhood in Delhi.  Of course, Muslim men with their
beards and topis or skullcaps were also conspicuous during many of these protests.
10 This  kind  of  dog-whistle  politics  has  become  increasingly  common  with  no  overt
references to Muslims as the “traitorous other” but rather the association being left to
the minds of supporters. A number of analysts have highlighted how the PM and other
high-ranking members of the BJP have avoided openly divisive language, while other
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sections of the BJP have continuously propagated the language of hate ever since the
2014 election victory. I have argued elsewhere that this “politics of ventriloquism” has
allowed PM Modi to try and cultivate a more acceptable image that hinges on “distance
and deniability” while avoiding any neglect of the BJP’s core agenda of Hindutva and
the promotion of  ethno-religious nationalism (Mahmudabad 2019).  For example,  PM
Modi made references to Shamshān (cremation), Qabristān (Muslim cemeteries), Diwali
and Ramzan during election rallies in 2017(Naqvi 2017).  The Chief Minister of Uttar
Pradesh, Yogi Adityanath echoed these words in 2019 while also using more explicit
references  by  speaking  of  Muslims  as  “the  sons  of  Babur”  and  by  comparing  the
election to a contest between Ali and Bajrang Bali. The former is a reference to Ali ibn
Abi  Talib,  the  Prophet’s  cousin  and  son-in-law,  while  the  latter  is  a  reference  to
Hanuman (Rai 2020).  Meanwhile,  during  the  same elections,  local  BJP  politicians  in
Barabanki (UP) openly said that the PM had broken the morale of Muslims for five
years  and  now  people  should  vote  for  him  if  they  want  to  “destroy  the  breed  of
Muslims” (2019). The 2019 election in some ways marked a departure from the BJP’s
policies  during  its  first  term  in  office,  when  it  had  initially  made  some  abortive
attempts to make inroads into the Muslim community.
11 PM Modi had initially sought to try to paint some Muslims as more acceptable and in
particular  focused  the  BJP’s  efforts  in  making  inroads  amongst  Shi’as  and Sufis  by
arguing that they were more “Indian” in their practices (Mahmudabad 2018). To this
end, the Muslim Rashtriya Manch, an unofficial outreach wing of the RSS headed by RSS
member Indresh Kumar, has tried to cultivate goodwill between Shias and Sufis but
these  efforts  have  largely  remained  marginal  and  ineffective  (Pal 2020).  The  BJP
government even patronized a “World Sufi Conference” in 2016 and an Islamic Heritage
Conference (Agha 2020) in 2018 in order to try to argue that Indian Muslims represent
“true” Islam and could therefore be seen as a bulwark against radicalism and terrorism.
Of  course  despite  these  overtures,  the  fact  remains  that  politically  the  BJP  was
committed to propagating the threat of Love Jihad (Muslim men deliberately targeting
non-Muslim  women  in  order  to  convert  them  to  Islam  through  marriage),  the
importance  of  Ghar  Wapsi (reconversion  back  to  Hinduism),  reforming  Muslims  by
abolishing  Shari’ah  and  in  particular  uplifting  Muslims  women.  In  theory,  this
externally  imposed  law  might  make  the  position  of  Muslim  women  better  but
importantly it also criminalizes Muslim men who use Triple Talaq as a form of divorce. 
12 It is of note that although Triple Talaq is only practiced by a small majority of Sunnis,
Muslims from other schools of thought who are jurisprudentially against the practice,
including scholars from Deoband and the Shi’a, argued against the law. Senior leaders
like Zafaryab Jilani, member of the All India Muslim Personal Law Board and convener
of  the  Babri  Masjid  Action  committee,  had  welcomed  the  original  Supreme  Court
decision to ban Triple Talaq. Jilani stated that “when the SC rendered the practice of
instant triple talaq or talaq-e-biddat invalid, we felt it will help us, as we wanted the
practice to go away too. But criminalizing the breach of a civil contract is against our
fundamental rights. A monetary compensation would have been better for the woman
(Venugopal 2019).” In other words the BJP actually lost the support of Muslims on the
issue because the act was seen as a precedent in criminalizing a civil matter as far as
Muslim men are concerned and a possible indication of the eventual imposition of a
Uniform Civil Code. In essence, the Triple Talaq law was seen as yet another instance of
the weaponization of the law. As I have argued elsewhere, “triple talaq has become an
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issue that  is  clothed in the language of  women’s  empowerment but is  essentially  a
political stick with which to beat the Muslim community” (Mahmudabad 2018). 
13 This contradictory approach can perhaps best be explained by viewing the outreach to
Muslims  as  an  effort  directed  towards  offsetting  the  image  that  the  BJP  is
fundamentally  anti-Muslim.  Indeed,  as  was  argued  earlier,  this  deliberate  use  of
multiple registers also allowed the BJP to obfuscate its supremacist agenda by pointing
to instances in which it has tried to work for the benefit of the Muslim community.
Additionally, the efforts to gain the sympathy if not the support of certain sub-sections
of  the  Muslim  community—Shi’as,  Sufis,  women—were  completely  negated  by  the
promulgation and eventual ratification of the CAA. Indeed, the primarily women-led
anti-CAA protests not only undid the BJP’s efforts to try and appear somewhat more
accommodative of Muslims but the CAA also acted as a force that served to consolidate
“Muslim”  identity  over  more  particular  sectarian  identities  such  as  Shi’a,  Sufi,
Deobandi,  Barelvi  and Salafi  amongst others.  The caste and class diversity amongst
Indian Muslims are  well  known but,  for  the  time being,  the  CAA became a  shared
symbol of  future fears and anxieties amongst the community.  This consolidation of
Indian Muslims has also been accompanied by a change in the wider topography of
India’s political terrain. 
 
A Shift in Centre
14 One of the important shifts that has taken place with the recent ascent of the BJP is a
shift of the center of Indian politics further to the right. This shift has also meant that
the many secular opposition parties have also had to accommodate this change in their
own political positions vis-à-vis Muslims. This, in turn, is therefore another factor that
remains important in understanding the shift from marginalization towards exclusion.
In 2019 the BJP only got 16.8 percent of the vote of the total population. This translates
to  25.1  percent  of  the  total  voting  population  and  37.4  percent  of  total  votes
polled (2020). In other words, the BJP came close to the kind of margins obtained by the
Congress in the 1980s. Of course, a substantial percentage of people did not vote for the
BJP, but it would be an erroneous to assume that non-BJP voters were voting against it
based on ideological disagreement. Indeed, by November 2019, the BJP had begun to
lose important state elections and its vote share fell by 22 percentage points, but its
ideological  project  remained  focused  and  many  issues  remained  unopposed  by
opposition parties (Gupta 2020). 
15 In  explaining  the  causes  of  a  BJP  victory  in  UP  despite  an  increasingly  stagnant
economy and a lackluster performance by CM Adityanath, Gilles Verniers highlighted a
number  of  reasons  including  PM  Modi’s  continuing  popularity,  caste-based
mobilization and the weakness of  the “Mahagathbandan” alliance of  the Samajwadi
Party and the Bahujan Samaj Party and the flawed assumption that there would be a
unification  of the  Jatav,  Yadav  and Muslim vote.  Vernier  adds  another  reason and
argues that 
the rise of the BJP in UP has been accompanied by a vast expansion of Sangh
Parivar-related organisations and by the spread of  ideas  nurtured by the
Sangh Parivar at the ground level, including in rural constituencies. There is
no denying that the BJP’s performance across the Hindi belt also has a strong
cultural dimension, in the sense that the core ideology that animates the BJP
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and its  parent  organisation finds  more acceptability.  Sakshi  Maharaj,  the
BJP’s  saffron mascot from Unnao,  won with 56 percent of  the vote share
(Verniers 2019). 
16 Verniers qualifies this argument by saying that it can only be verified after specific
data is  collected.  Interestingly,  data from an unpublished survey of  under-35 youth
voting patterns in four states—Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh—
before the 2019 elections illustrates that the BJP had issue-based support from non-
voters for its “Hindutva” agenda (Bhupathiraju 2020). For example, 84.7 percent voters
intending to vote for the BJP supported the introduction of the Uniform Civil Code,
while 74.29 percent of voters who did not intend to vote for the BJP supported it on this
specific issue. According to the survey, a significant number of youth who were not
planning on voting for the BJP nonetheless gave it issue-based support on issues like
the Ram Mandir (55.48 percent), the abrogation of Article 370 (70.24 percent), the CAA
(40 percent), Triple Talaq (62 percent) and Cow protection (71.88 percent). With the
exception  of  support  for  the  CAA,  it  is  clear  that  the  BJP’s  cultural  and  ethno-
nationalist  agenda  has  found  substantial  resonance  beyond  just  its  own  voters.
Prashant  Waikar’s  analysis  also  supports  the  thesis  that  a  Hindutva  driven
Islamophobia has crept into the Hindu mainstream (Waikar 2018).
17 It  is  noteworthy that during the Delhi  violence in February 2020,  “centrist” Arvind
Kejriwal of  the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) was conspicuous by his  silence.  Indeed,  his
continued refusal to take any position on the violence was made all the more stark
because of the fact that his own party’s MLA, Amanatullah Khan and councilor Tahir
Husain were targeted as instigators of the Delhi violence by the BJP. Senior journalist
Ashutosh  saw  Kejriwal’s  political  quietism  as  proof  of  the  fact  that  AAP  had
transformed from a movement to a political party, which did not want to play on the
BJP’s pitch (Ashutosh 2020). The idea that silence on Muslims issues was acceptable for
the sake of the larger goal of defeating the BJP is partly illustrative of the argument
that India’s political center has shifted to the right. 
18 Indeed, even the Congress Party, which opposed the CAA, was forced to shift its policy
in  Assam  with  former  Congress  Chief  Minster  Gogoi  even  claiming  credit  for  the
Congress being the original proponent of the NRC (Mahaprashastra 2018). The manner
in which the Congress adopted a kind of “soft Hindutva,” made most famous by Rahul
Gandhi’s temple-hopping in the 2014 national elections, and then in the 2017 Gujarat
and UP state elections,  betrayed an anxiety that it  wanted to shed its pro-minority
image (Virk 2017). This perception that the Congress party, and indeed other secular
parties, had worked for the interests only of Muslims was part of the BJP’s narrative in
seeking to delegitimize those parties. Inevitably this meant that the Congress as well as
other secular opposition parties became cautious in reacting to and highlighting any
issues that were seen to be overtly “Muslim” issues.
19 For  instance,  in  Uttar  Pradesh,  following  the  Muzaffarnagar  Riots  in  2013,  the
Samajwadi Party was blamed for not doing enough to protect Muslims.  The party’s
“Muslim” face, Azam Khan, famously did not show up to a national executive meeting
of the party because he thought the government had not done enough to contain the
violence  (Gupta 2013).  Subsequently,  the  Chief  Minister,  Akhilesh  Yadav  gave  an
interview alleging that there was a BJP conspiracy to tarnish the SP’s  “secular and
socialist” credentials and also said it is “difficult to be secular” (Jaiswal 2014). No doubt
this formulation also contained within it an indication that the BJP had been successful
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in setting electoral narratives that made it “difficult” to be secular. This narrative was
promoted by the Congress party, which implied that the BJP and SP were in cahoots
like “Tweedledum and Tweedledee in order to absolve each other” (2016). The result of
this  entire  game  of  finger  pointing  was  that  the  BJP  was  able  to  consolidate  its
supporters while doubts were raised in the minds of Muslims vis-à-vis secular parties. 
20 The shift of the BJP and consequently the shift of secular opposition parties to the right
has  also  created a  space  for  a  Muslim leaders  such as  Asaddudin  Owaisi,  MP from
Hyderabad and leader of the All India Majlis Ittehadul Muslimeen (AIMIM). Owaisi has
created the perception of being a leader who is unapologetically vocal about Muslim
and Dalit issues. He has also raised doubts about the manner in which secular parties
view Muslim issues  (Singh 2019).  Thus,  the  BJP’s  clarity  about  not  wanting  Muslim
votes7 combined with a reality wherein its cultural agenda finds resonance even outside
its  voters  and supporters  has  resulted  in  a  diminished space  for  secularism in  the
political sphere. In Delhi, which has a sizeable Muslim population, neither the Congress
nor AAP nor the BJP fielded a Muslim candidate in the 2019 Lok Sabha elections. In fact,
since  the  early  1990s  the  Congress  has  never  fielded  more  than  7  percent  Muslim
candidates  despite  the allegations that  it  has  unjustly  favored Muslims (2020).  It  is,
therefore, no surprise that this shift of center to the right in Indian politics has in part
contributed to a parallel shift in the space occupied by Muslims in national politics.
This shift is partly symbolized, as was argued earlier, by the change in the grammar
and vocabulary of Muslims from demanding the fulfillment of the recommendations of
the  Sachar  Commission  Report  to  demanding  protection  for  India’s  constitutional
principles. In other words the shift of the political center further to the right is also
constitutive  of  the  shift  of  Indian Muslims from marginalization towards  exclusion
while  paradoxically  also  creating  a  space  for  Muslims  to  propose  an  explicitly
community-oriented politics.8 Sharjeel Imam, a student leader and activist, who was
arrested under the UAPA laws, is perhaps one example of the manner in which younger
Muslims,  disillusioned  by  both  the  BJP  and  the  opposition,  have  sought  to
unapologetically articulate a distinctly Muslim-centric politics. 
 
From Marginalization towards Exclusion
21 Over the course of five years of the BJP government, the lynching of Muslim cattle
farmers,  the  closure  of  abattoirs,  the  difficulty  in  finding accommodation in  urban
areas, accusations of love jihad, the rewriting of text books and constant calls to be
accountable for 1000 years of real and imagined crimes by Muslim rulers as well as the
constant charge of being fifth columnists sponsored by Pakistan has made Muslims feel
politically  and  socially  excluded  and  humiliated.  The  lack  of  a  political  leadership
combined with the shift in the politics of secular parties and the lack of trust in the
judicial  and  institutional  apparatus  of  the  state  has  ensured  that  Muslims  feel
increasingly  despondent  and  as  some  commentators  have  said  “abandoned”
(Biswas 2020). Even before the 2019 elections, I participated in a number of closed-door
meetings  in  which  academics,  journalists,  religious  scholars,  imams  of  mosques,
professionals and students voiced concern for the uncertain future that they faced. 
22 Overall,  four  distinct  views  emerged  from  these  various  discussions.  The  first
encouraged quietism and indeed even complete withdrawal from active politics while
encouraging  a  focus  on  promoting  education  and  business.  This  group  was  of  the
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opinion  that  proponents  of  Hindutva  and  secular  Hindus  need  to  fight  it  out  and
Muslim active involvement was nothing more than a red rag to a bull.  The second
group  was  of  the  view  that  Muslims  should  support  secular  parties  despite  being
conscious  of  the  fact  that  these  parties  also  faced  a  challenge  in  articulating  and
standing up for the rights of Muslims. A third view was characterized by an insistence
that Muslims should organize politically and fight for their own rights: this model often
put forth Asaduddin Owaisi as an ideal role model. This view was particularly popular
amongst  the  younger  generations.  The  fourth  model  suggested  that  Muslims  had
brought  hardship  upon  themselves  by  straying  from  the  “true” path  of  Islam  and
therefore the only way out of the hardships that they faced was by becoming more
authentically  Muslim.  Needless  to  say,  parts  of  the  arguments  of  all  four  groups
overlapped. However, on the whole class, caste and sectarian differences, as well as the
degree of religious orthodoxy, all meant that there was no unified or indeed common
thread  that  bound  these  groups  together  apart  from  their  opposition  to  the  BJP.
Needless  to  say,  these  conversations  had  little  impact  on  the  course  of  the  2019
elections. 
23 After the 2019 Lok Sabha election victory the BJP passed a whole raft of legislation that
was perceived by the community as anti-Muslim. This included the Triple Talaq Bill,9
the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA) and the revocation and abrogation of
article 370. By November the Supreme Court had decreed that the land on which the
Babri Masjid had stood was indeed the birthplace of Lord Ram and would therefore be
handed over to a trust which in turn would oversee the building of a temple. Each of
these issues drew criticism from community leaders as well as lay Muslims but there
was no overwhelming reaction. While there was much speculation about how Muslims
would respond to the Ayodhya judgment, reactions were on the whole muted. 
24 The  day  after  the  judgment,  a  closed-door  meeting  was held  at  the  residence  of
National  Security  Advisor,  Ajit  Doval  with  leaders  of  the  Hindu  and  Muslim
communities.  Amongst  others,  the  meeting  was  attended  by  Muhammad  Salim
Engineer, vice-president of the Jamāt-e Islami Hind, Navaid Hamid, President of the All
India Muslim Majlis-e Mushāwarat, Maulana Kalbe Jawad, a Shi’a community leader and
general secretary of the Majlis-e Ulamā-e Hind, Ahmad Khan Daryabadi of the All India
‘Ulama  Council  and  Professor  Akhtarul  Wasey,  an  academic  and  president  of  the
Maulana  Azad  University  in Jodhpur.  The  meeting  drew  criticism  from  various
segments of Muslim society and in particular from young members of the community
and student leaders who were vociferous about the betrayal by these men (Faraz 2019).
The anniversary of the destruction of the Babri Masjid on December 6, 2019 came and
went  without  much  ado  but  the  clearance,  two  days  earlier,  of  the  Citizenship
Amendment Bill  (CAB) by the union cabinet had already caused a stir.  Between the
December 9 when the bill  was tabled in parliament and the December 12 when the
President gave his assent, the anti-CAA movement had already begun to get up steam. 
25 As anti-CAA protests multiplied, the BJP resorted to the use of violence and strict anti-
terror laws to try and stifle dissent. Police either used brutal violence, as was the case
in Jamia Millia,  Aligarh and JNU, or used anti-terror sedition laws to stifle protests
(Ahmad 2019). Where the police were unable to do anything, groups affiliated to the
BJP attacked protestors and sought to browbeat them into withdrawal. According to a
Human Rights Watch report more than 30 people died in December alone because the
police used excessive and lethal force in BJP ruled states (Bajoria 2020). However, this
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only added momentum to the anti-CAA protests. The iconic Shaheen Bagh protest was
started on the December 15 and by January 2020 the protests had spread all over India
and notably the template of a sit-in in a public area, led mostly by Muslim women, was
followed  across  the  country.  Meanwhile the  BJP’s  IT  cell  had  been  busy  using  the
protests in order to consolidate anti-Muslim sentiment. A popular WhatsApp forward
laid out how the Muslims would be controlled in 4 steps: 1) CAB = No Entry 2) NRC =
Check  &  Throw  3) Population  Control  =  No  pig  breeding  and  4) UCC  =  Keep  under
control (2019). The last two points to do with population control and the imposition of
a Uniform Civil Code were already being seen by Muslims as very real possibilities. In
part,  this crude, yet cunningly formulated four-step program contains within it  the
goal  of  legal,  institutional,  socio-cultural  and political  marginalization and eventual
exclusion of Muslims. 
26 Perhaps  the  most  potent  and  symbolically  powerful  illustration  of  this  shift  from
marginalization  to  complete  exclusion  was  the  death  of  a  young  man  in  Delhi  in
February. During the violence in North-East Delhi, a video emerged of a group of men
being forced to sing the national anthem as the police beat them. One of the victims,
Faizan, eventually succumbed to his injuries and even some days after his death the
hospital authorities refused to hand over his body to his family (2020). The very fact
that singing the national anthem did not stop the beating is illustrative of the fact that
even overt declarations of patriotism by Muslims are perhaps no longer enough even to
save  their  lives.  The  anti-CAA  protests  and  the  ensuing  violent  clampdown  were
perhaps the starkest illustrations of the manner in which Muslims had become legally
and institutionally  vulnerable,  socially  and culturally  ostracized  and politically  and
economically isolated. 
 
Conclusion: Alienation and Exclusion as Precursors to
Violence
27 Despite the BJP’s arguments that Muslims have historically been “appeased” by secular
parties,  the  fact  remains  that  the  previous  systematic  marginalization  of  Indian
Muslims is now transforming into outright exclusion. Indeed, this lethal combination of
social, cultural, economic, institutional, legal and political exclusion promises to sow
the seeds of conflict for years to come. Almost 50 percent of Indian Muslims are under
19 with experience and historical memory stretching back twenty years at the most.
Perhaps the most defining global moment of the past twenty years was 9/11. Muslims
across the world faced an altogether new level of scrutiny as the “War on Terror” was
used by states across the world to justify the curtailment and even suspension of civil
liberties. In India the BJP was able to capitalize on this “foreign threat” to consolidate
its vote but also to semantically collapse the specter of Muslim invaders of the past
1000  years,  Kashmiri  separatists,  illegal  migrants,  and  international  terrorists.  This
created  a  seamless  narrative  in  which  Hindu  civilization  was  and  continues  to  be
perpetually under threat from Muslims and Islam. Indeed, a mere 3 days after 9/11,
Narendra Modi, then general secretary of the BJP, appeared on Star TV’s “Big Fight.”
After the usual disclaimers that there are some good aspects to Islam, he said that Islam
has been “seeking to put its flag on the whole world and the situation today [2001] is a
result  of  that”  (Elliott 2015).  A  few  months  later  he  termed  Godhra  (Mitta 2017)  a
“preplanned inhuman collective violent act of terrorism.” The subsequent communal
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violence was termed as the “natural reaction” and as Parwis Ghassem-Fachandi argues,
the “equation of communal violence with terrorism allowed for a pogrom to emerge,
laden with sacrificial terminology and unifying Hindus in new ways” (Ghassem 2012).
Indeed, in subsequent years the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai (spoken of by commentators
as India’s own 9/11), the Ahmadabad bombings in 2008 and the Pulwama bombings in
2019 came to play a pivotal role in the BJP narrative as well as determining the course
of India’s politics.
28 The past twenty years have also been the time during which Narendra Modi has risen
from Gujarat state politics to the national stage. His ascent and the rise of the BJP has
exacerbated feelings of alienation and exclusion amongst young Indian Muslims as they
confront  India’s  new  and  hard  political  realities.  Although  many  of  these  young
Muslims will  not carry the burden of  partition,  it  is  by no means evident that this
burden  will  not  be  foisted  upon  them. In  the  run  up  to  the  Delhi  elections  CM
Adityanath (2020)  declared  that  “Muslims  had  done  no  favours  to  India  by  staying
here” after partition.
29 For young Indian Muslims, the memory of these twenty years inevitably begins with
Godhra  in  2002,  continues  through  Muzaffarnagar  in  2013,  and  most  recently
culminates in the deadly violence in Delhi in 2020. The violence came in the aftermath
of the AAP’s victory in the Delhi elections and the increasing momentum of the anti-
CAA protests. As it abated in late February and as the anti-CAA protests were gradually
called off  for health reasons,  the COVID 19 pandemic brought with it  new forms of
social  ostracization.  Members  of  the  Tablighi  Jamaat  were  targeted  for  allegedly
deliberately spreading the corona virus because of an international meeting that they
had  held  in  Delhi  in  March.  Of  course,  the  fact  that  members  of  other  religious
communities held similar religious meetings in March was conveniently ignored. At a
time when secular nationalism was most necessary in order to stave off the threat of
the  virus,  hashtags  of  #QuranVirus  and  #IslamicVirus  trended  on  Twitter  while
mainstream  media  began  promoting  conspiracy  theories  of  “Corona  Jihad.”  This
misinformation  eventually  resulted  in  calls  for  a  social  and  economic  boycott  of
Muslims.10 A BJP legislator, Suresh Tiwari (2020) from Deoria in UP, asked people to not
buy  vegetables  from  “miyans.”  Meanwhile  as  the  anti-Muslim  sentiment  grew,  the
Organisation  of  Islamic  Cooperation  called  for  an  end  to  Islamophobia  in  India.  In
keeping  with  the  aforementioned  “politics  of  ventriloquism,”  PM  Modi  tweeted  a
generic message the next day about how Covid 19 does not discriminate on the basis of
race and religion.11
30 The BJP’s attempt to promote its religious and nationalist agenda did not stop despite
the havoc the pandemic was wreaking across India. Over the course of the summer the
BJP continued its witch-hunt of anti-CAA protestors (2020). Delhi police arrested and
jailed Safoora Zargar, a student leader from Jamia who was pregnant. Previously Dr.
Kafeel Khan had been booked under the stringent NSA laws for making an anti-CAA
speech in January.12 Umar Khalid, co-founder of activist group United against Hate and
a former student leader in JNU, was arrested along with several other students and
activists under the UAPA laws for allegedly instigating the Delhi violence. The message
was crystal clear: no dissent will be tolerated. 
31 Amidst  the  pandemic,  on  the  August  5,  PM  Modi  and  the  BJP  chose  to  hold  the
foundation-laying ceremony for the Ram Temple in Ayodhya. The news was met with
muted silence within the Muslim community. Just over a month and half later all those
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who had been accused of  demolishing the Babri  Masjid were acquitted for “lack of
evidence” and the judge decreed that there was no premeditated plan. A video made by
CBI officers of Atal Bihari Vajpaee’s speech in Lucknow on the December 5, 1992 calling
for “sharp stones needing to be leveled” was not deemed legally admissible evidence.
The acquittal did, of course, entrench earlier views that Muslims could not even expect
justice from the courts, but it did not lead to any confrontation or protest. Meanwhile,
Sudarshan TV channel alleged that Muslims were waging “UPSC-Jihad” in order to try
and  “infiltrate”  the  civil  services.13 The  continuation  of  the  Hindutva  agenda,  and
consequently the increasing lack of trust in institutions amongst Muslims, can perhaps
partly be understood by the fact that the RSS is no longer just a cultural organization.
In  fact,  as  Pralay  Kanungo  argues,  its  members  hold  prominent  positions  in  the
bureaucracy, judiciary and in politics. Furthermore, “the BJP has no more pretentions
about being autonomous from the RSS” (Kunango 2019). 
32 It  is  noteworthy  that  Muslims  have  remained  largely  quiet  in  response  to  the
continuous provocations and attacks by the BJP.  The anti-CAA protests represented
both a moment of desperation as well as of hope because there was a realization that
the  BJP  wanted  to  transform  citizenship  from  a  right  into  a  privilege.  William  F.
Meinecke,  Jr.,  a  historian at the United States Holocaust Memorial  Museum, writes,
“today  denial  of  citizenship  has  become  a  weapon…[and]  laws  restricting  certain
groups from citizenship or government services can be a warning sign of more extreme
measures to come” (Meinecke 2015). It is this fear of what lies ahead that sparked the
anti-CAA protests across India.
33 In the coming months and years, the BJP will likely continue its project of vilifying
Indian Muslims in  order  to  further  its  political  project  of  Hindutva  and creating  a
Hindu Rashtra. As Gyan Prakash has argued the two choices that emerge following the
elevation of Hindutva are that either Muslims and Christians are “violently assimilated
into the nation or excised as foreign elements” (Prakash 2007). A glimpse of how to
resist  this  legal  and epistemic violence was provided by the anti-CAA protests.  The
protests represented the beginnings of a new vocabulary and grammar of politics. As
Asim Ali argues, this emerged from the Muslim protestors who seamlessly combined
their religious identity with their national identity.  “The protesters would chant ‘la
ilaha  illalah’ and  ‘samvidhan  zindabad,  jai  bhim’ in  the  same  breath.  That  perpetual
question which greets every Muslim— ‘are you a Muslim first or an Indian first?.’—was
dissolved  into  irrelevance”  (Ali 2020).  Of  course,  the  Muslims  were  supported  by
members  of  other  religious  communities  and  secular  citizens,  but  the  core  of  the
protests remained resolutely Muslim. It  was almost as if  they had managed to gain
political  ground  and  were  unwilling  to  cede  it.  The  famous  Dadis  or  Nanis
(grandmothers)  of  Shaheen Bagh became the  most  enduring  and indeed endearing
figures  of  the  protests.  Their  simple  yet  clear  politics  was  far  removed  from  the
vocabulary  of  traditional  Muslim leaders.  While  Ali  optimistically,  indeed  laudably,
argues that secular Hindus must carry the CAA protests into the next phase by taking
the message of Shaheen Bagh to their own spaces, it remains to be seen how and if this
will happen. In the meantime, however, a larger danger lurks as the BJP resorts to the
open use of both legal and physical violence in stifling dissent. 
34 It  is  not  coincidental  that  ISIS  launched  a  ten-page  magazine  aimed  at  awakening
Indian Muslims immediately  in  the  aftermath of  the  Delhi  violence.  While  terming
nationalism a disease, an article berated Muslims for having strayed from the path of
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true Islam and identified this as the main cause of their humiliations. The desire to see
the lack of personal piety as the cause for political decline is something that has been a
recurring trope in the writings of Indian Muslim scholars going back all the way to the
18th century. Naturally the article damned the BJP but also labeled Maulana Arshad
Madani14 and his nephew Mahmood Madani as “the wicked scholars of Islam.” Both
men have been the target of criticism by young Muslims for their alleged détente with
the RSS and BJP. The article carried photos of Asaduddin Owaisi and Kanhaiya Kumar15
as examples of those who “mislead” Muslim youth and it ended with an exhortation to
“fight in the name of Allah…for the pen has been lifted and the scrolls have dried.”16
35 Of  course,  there  are  hardly  any  takers  for  this  narrative  and  most  of  India’s  ISIS
volunteers have come from relatively affluent areas of Kerala (Taneja 2019). However,
as Abdul Rasheed Abdullah, a preacher of ISIS ideology in Kerala has said, the rise of the
BJP is a “blessing in disguise” (Taneja 2019). For the moment young Muslims have tried
to  use  democratic  means  to  register  their  opinions  and have  often paid  dearly  for
articulating their opposition. The true danger will arise when no spaces of dissent exist
anymore. The Supreme Court has already ruled that Shaheen Bagh and similar spaces
may no longer be used as sites for “indefinite” protests. The court further ruled that
protests would have to held in specially designated areas (Pritam 2020). As space for
public and indeed private dissent narrows, it will only take a handful of disenchanted
angry young men and women to take up arms in order to assert themselves. Of course,
this will only perpetuate the stereotype already propagated by the BJP that all Muslims
are crypto-jihadis. 
36 This will be further amplified by frustration amongst young non-Muslims due to the
political and social destabilization brought about by the economic recession. The BJP
will seek to use this anger and direct it towards Muslims in order to depict them as the
main culprits of the country’s woes. For the past six years, the BJP has used the specter
of the “anti-national Muslim” in order to justify everything from demonetization to the
NRC.  It  used  precisely  this  logic  in  justifying  the  lockdown  in  Kashmir  thus
demonstrating the extent to which the BJP will go in order to fulfill its agenda. So far
Kashmiri militancy has been mostly confined to the state, but as the BJP manufactures
its own Israel-Palestine conflict, it is unclear what direction Indian politics will take.
Historically, people have turned to violence when they feel that they no longer have a
stake in society. As I have argued, the continual humiliation and alienation of Muslims
combined with a shift from marginalization to exclusion does not bode well for India’s
democratic future. The anti-CAA protests stared at this moral and political abyss and
refused to give up democratic means of protest. However, if a cycle of violence begins
there is no predicting where it will take India. 
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NOTES
1. I am grateful to Baji for helping me refine various aspects of this paper. I would also like to
thank Zainab Firdausi and Meher Manga for helping with copy-editing. 
2. Given the hostile response by the BJP government following the CAA protests, I have decided
not to name the organizations and people involved in order to protect their identities. 
3. On September 15, 1935 the Nazis announced the promulgation of laws that gave legal sanction
to the racist and anti-Semitic theories found in Nazi ideology. The laws excluded German Jews
from Reich citizenship and forbade them from marrying or having extra-martial relations with
anyone  of  “German  or  related  blood.”  Other  related  and  ancillary  ordinances  to  these  laws
disenfranchised Jews and deprived them of a majority of their political rights. This kind of moral
and social policing is not new in India either. 
The Allahabad High court gave an order on the September 23, 2020 in which it observed that
voluntary conversion by an adult for the purposes of marriage is not valid. This observation was
subsequently cited by Yogi Adityanath at an election rally in Jaunpur (Uttar Pradesh) in order to
propose a law for stopping “love jihad.” In a veiled threat he said men who hide their identities
and play with the honor of “our” sisters and daughters should prepare for their funerals. He
invoked the phrase “Ram Nām Satya Hai” or “Ram’s name is truth,” which is recited at funerals.
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Ironically the case before the Allahabad High Court was not about “love jihad” but rather about a
Muslim woman converting to Hinduism to marry a Hindu man. 
4. See this Video of Anurag Thakur, BJP member of parliament using this slogan: The Logical
Indian, Desh Ke Ghaddaron Ko....BJP Leader Anurag Thakur Leads Supporters in Delhi. [video] Retrieved
September 12, 2020 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w8B_eVwtve0). 
5. See Kapil Mishra, BJP MLA candidate in Delhi in 2020 elections, using this slogan during a pro-
CAA rally in December 2019:  In Khabar,  Kapil  Mishra on Target  of  CAA protestors,  Tiranga Rally.
Retrieved September 12, 2020 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=snR54Xvjaz8). 
6. See this Mojo Story, In the heart of Delhi, Desh ke gaddaron ko, goli maro saalon ko. What’s the Delhi
police  doing? [video]  Retrieved  September  12,  2020,  ( https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=zM09nY1qd8k). 
7. In 2014, 19 Muslim members of parliament were elected and in 2019, 23 Muslim members of
parliament were elected. The BJP did not field any Muslim candidates in the national elections
although it has on occasion fielded Muslim candidates in Municipal and State elections. 
8. I  use the word “toward” rather than “to” in order to indicate that  this  is  a  continuously
dynamic process that has not yet reached a point of absolute exclusion.
9. The Triple Talaq bill abolished the practice of Muslim men divorcing their wives by uttering
divorce three times. The bill criminalized this practice and so, far from being seen as a move to
uplift women, it was seen as an attempt to weaponize the law against Muslim men. 
The UAPA laws of 1967 were amended so that individuals could be indicted for terrorism. Earlier
only  organizations  were  designated  as  “terrorist  organization”  but  following  the  2019
amendments individuals could also be deemed terrorists. Individuals charged under the UAPA
act  can  be  kept  in  custody  for  180  days  without  bail  pending  filing  of  the  charge  sheet.
Furthermore, bail can be refused by courts if the judge believes there are reasonable grounds for
believing that the accusations against the person are prima facie true.  A number of anti-CAA
protestors have been charged under the UAPA laws. These include, Akhil Gogoi, Meeran Haider,
Safoora Zargar,  Sharjeel  Imam and Umar Khalid  amongst  others.  Poets,  civil  rights  activists,
journalists and intellectuals have also been victims of the UAPA laws. These include Binayak Sen,
Varavara  Rao,  Sudha  Bhardwaj,  Anant  Teltumbde,  Devangana  Kalita,  Stan  Swamy and  many
others. 
The abrogation of article 370 removed the special status of Kashmir which enabled it to have its
own  constitution,  freedom  to  make  its  own  laws  and  its  own  flag.  Foreign  affairs,  defense
matters, and communication remained under the purview of the Indian government. The limited
autonomy allowed Kashmir  to  decide  who was legally  a  permanent  resident,  who could buy
property and other fundamental laws. The abrogation of 370 was seen as a means of paving the
way to alter Kashmir’s demography so that the valley would not\ longer have a Muslim majority
population.
10. I  personally  received a  number  of  messages  and telephone calls  from well-meaning and
ostensibly “educated” friends who wondered why the Tablighi Jamaat was trying to spread the
virus intentionally. Ideological differences with the Tablighis aside, it was shocking to see the
manner in which the BJP’s propaganda had made its way into the homes, or perhaps one should
say phones, of even its opponents. 
11. Tweet  retrieved  September  15,  2020  (https://twitter.com/PMOIndia/status/
1251839308085915649?s=20). 
12. In August 2017 over 60 children died due to a lack of oxygen in Gorakhpur’s BRD Medical
College. The hospital had faced a shortage of oxygen and so one of the resident doctors, Kafeel
Khan, had bought cylinders with his own money. The newly elected BJP government headed by
CM Yogi Adityanath immediately blamed Dr. Kafeel Khan for the deaths, suspended his medical
license and put him in prison. Subsequently, even though a medical commission found him to be
not guilty the government did not restore his license. Dr. Khan was released on the April 25,
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2018. Later that year his brother was shot by unknown assailants whom Dr. Khan claimed had
acted on the behest of the BJP. In 2019 he was acquitted of all charges related to the Gorakhpur
tragedy.  In December 2019 he was arrested under the NSA for giving an anti-CAA speech in
Aligarh.  In  March 2020  the  suspension of  the  other  three  medical  doctors,  all  of  whom are
incidentally non-Muslim, was revoked by CM Adityanath’s government. Dr. Kafeel was released
in June 2020 but still does not have his medical license despite the fact that he was absolved of
medical  negligence  by  a  government  appointed  enquiry  in  August  2019.  For  many  Indian
Muslims, Dr. Khan’s case became symbolic of the relentless manner in which the BJP has sought
to scapegoat even those Muslims who discharge their duties professionally. Dr. Khan had initially
been feted by the media for having bought oxygen cylinders for the children in the hospital with
his own money. 
13. Subsequently the courts banned the airing of the program but by that point the issue of
“UPSC Jihad” had been already highlighted by media news cycles and on social media. 
14. NB:  Arshad Madani  is  an  influential  scholar  and  leader  from the  Deoband school.  He  is
President of a pan-India association of religious scholars called Jamiat Ulama-e Hind. His nephew,
Mahmood Madani is general secretary of the Jamiat Ulama-e Hind and was nominated to the upper
house of parliament in India as a member of the Rashtriya Lok Dal. In 2019 there were signs of a
détente  between  uncle  and  nephew,  but  both  also  faced  huge  backlash  from  the  Muslim
community for praising PM Modi and the RSS. Both Madanis are relatives of the former principal
of the Deoband seminary, Husain Ahmad Madani.
15. Kanhaiya Kumar is a student leader and former president of the Jawaharlal Nehru University
student’s union. He unsuccessfully contested the Lok Sabha elections in 2019 on the Communist
Party of India ticket.
16. Voice of Hind, vol. 1, Al Qitaal Media Centre, February 24, 2020.
ABSTRACTS
Since the victory of the BJP in 2014 there has been much speculation about the fate of Muslims
and their place in Indian politics. This paper seeks to argue that the recent rise of the BJP has
caused the center of politics to move further to the right which in turn has precipitated a change
in  the  politics  of  the  opposition  parties  as  well  wherein  Muslims  have  become  political
“untouchables.” I argue that this change also marks a shift of Indian Muslims from a position of
marginalization towards one of exclusion. The Citizenship Amendment Act, India’s Nuremberg
moment,  was a significant marker of  this  fundamental  shift  in the political,  economic,  legal,
institutional, cultural and social status of Indian Muslims.
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